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A POX ON BOTH YOUR HOUSES: WHY THE COURT CAN’T FIX
THE ERIE DOCTRINE 
Suzanna Sherry
*
As Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins
1
 celebrates its 75
th
 anniversary, it
is becoming more apparent that it is on a collision course with itself. The 
Court keeps trying – and failing – to sort out the tensions within the Erie 
doctrine and between it and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
Court’s latest Erie decision, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate 
Ins. Co.,
2
 was yet another attempt to separate substance from procedure and
navigate the strait between the Rules of Decision Act and the Rules 
Enabling Act. It was a disaster. It produced two distinct methodological 
approaches, three opinions – none commanding a majority – and a rash of 
academic commentary choosing sides between the two approaches. What it 
did not produce, unfortunately, is any recognition that the source of the 
problem is the internal incoherence of the Erie doctrine itself and its 
profound incompatibility with the guiding principles of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. In this essay, I identify the problem and suggest a solution. 
Shady Grove brings to the forefront two key questions that the Court 
has failed to confront, one technical and doctrinal and the other more 
broadly jurisprudential. The doctrinal question is how a court in a diversity 
case should treat a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that in general has no 
effect on substantive rights but that affects substantive rights in particular 
states or particular types of cases. Shady Grove itself is an example of this 
type of Rule – Rule 23 has no significant substantive effect in most states or 
most cases, but does so in cases seeking statutory damages under New York 
law – but the same problem also underlies other recent Erie cases. Courts 
have three real options in this situation: The Federal Rule governs 
regardless of its effect on state substantive rights, the Federal Rule governs 
*
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unless it has a demonstrable effect on state substantive rights, or the Federal 
Rule governs only when it has no imaginable effect on state substantive 
rights. Choosing among those three options requires a normative 
justification. That justification, in turn, depends on whether we place a 
greater value on the uniformity and transsubstantivity of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, or on states’ ultimate authority to define substantive 
rights. 
 
 My suggestion is that instead of filtering that normative choice 
through the convoluted and self-contradictory Erie doctrine, we confront it 
directly. Courts make exactly this value choice in other, similar contexts – 
including certain choice-of-law decisions, the dormant commerce clause 
doctrine, the application of federal common law in limited “enclaves,” and 
the determination of whether state law should be preempted on the ground 
that it serves as an obstacle to the fulfillment of the purpose of a federal 
statute. Courts confronting a possible conflict between federal and state law 
in the Erie context should use the same overarching framework that governs 
those situations. 
 
 That framework, like Erie itself, ultimately raises the deeper 
jurisprudential question: Under what circumstances is lawmaking by the 
federal judiciary justified? I contend that we should give the same answer in 
the Erie context that we do in these other contexts: whenever federal 
interests are sufficiently important to warrant judicial protection.  
 
Framing the question as one of judicial authority reveals that a large 
part of the problem with Erie is that it, contrary to these other cognate 
doctrines, depends on two false dichotomies (which my proposal 
eliminates). First, by allowing the federal legislature but not the federal 
judiciary to determine that federal interests justify overriding state 
substantive law, Erie draws an unwarranted distinction between federal 
legislative power and federal judicial power. Second, by allowing some 
“enclaves” of federal common law to remain, the Erie doctrine draws an 
unspoken and unjustified distinction between those federal interests that 
require legislative codification before the judiciary can act and those federal 
interests that can be protected by the judiciary without prior legislative 
authorization. 
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Reframing the Erie inquiry as asking whether protecting the 
transsubstantivity and uniformity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is 
a sufficiently important interest to justify overriding state substantive law 
makes Erie both internally coherent and consistent with kindred doctrines. 
It also solves the Shady Grove puzzle. And, as I note briefly at the end of 
this essay, it has broader implications for cases arising out of our 
nationalized consumer economy. 
 
I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
 
 The difficulty stems from the underlying goals of the Erie doctrine. 
According to Justice Brandeis’ majority opinion, the decision in Erie was 
necessary because of two major problems with Swift v. Tyson:
3
 Swift led to 
unfair differences in the treatment of similarly situated litigants
4
 and it 
transgressed the state’s primary authority by allowing the federal judiciary 
to “invad[e] rights which . . . are reserved by the Constitution to the several 
states.”5 Two decades later, the Court reaffirmed these purposes of Erie, 
although without the constitutional gloss, in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural 
Electric Cooperative, Inc.
6
 The Byrd Court described the core of Erie as a 
command that “the federal courts in diversity cases must respect the 
definition of state-created rights and obligations” and thus must apply state 
law if that law is “bound up with [state] rights and obligations.”7 In 
addition, according to Byrd, the Erie doctrine “evince[s] a broader policy” 
that federal courts should follow all state rules – even procedural ones not 
bound up with rights and obligations – if “the litigation would come out one 
way in the federal court and another way in the state court if the federal 
court failed to apply” state law.8 These policies are the same as the two 
                                                          
3 
41 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
4
 304 U.S. at 74. 
5
 Id. at 80. The Court also reinterpreted the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 
(2006). For critiques of this decidedly creative act of statutory interpretation, see Suzanna 
Sherry, Wrong, Out of Step, and Pernicious: Erie as the Worst Decision of All Time, 39 
Pepperdine L. Rev. 129, 133-37 (2011); Samuel Issacharoff, Federalized America:  
Reflections on Erie and State-Based Regulation, ___ Geo. Mason L. Rev. ___ (2013). 
6
 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
7
 Id. at 535. 
8
 Id. at 536-37. The Byrd court went on to balance the potential for different outcomes 
against “countervailing” federal interests. The adoption of such a balancing test has never 
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identified by Erie, in reverse order. Then in the seminal case of Hanna v. 
Plumer,
9
 the Court again reiterated one of the policies, noting that Erie was 
rooted in “a realization that it would be unfair for the character or result of a 
litigation materially to differ because the suit had been brought in federal 
court.”10   
 
 One goal underlies both of these frequently invoked policies, and 
forms the core purpose of and justification for the Erie doctrine. This key 
unitary goal is that our dual court systems should not result in disparate 
regulation of what Justice Harlan later called “primary decisions respecting 
human conduct.”11 The consequences of behavior that takes place outside 
the courtroom should not vary as a result of which seal adorns the 
courthouse door.  
 
 But the Erie doctrine is, and has to be, more nuanced than the 
mechanical implementation of this goal, because we do have dual court 
systems. And so accommodating differences between those systems – 
drawing lines between what happens inside the courtroom and what 
happens outside it – is a necessary part of the doctrine. As the Court found 
to its detriment early in the application and development of Erie, we cannot 
blithely assert that any state rule that affects the outcome in a diversity case 
must be applied notwithstanding contrary federal rules. Every difference 
between state and federal rules, however minor or “procedural,” has the 
potential to affect the outcome of litigation. To direct that in every such 
case the state rule controls is to ignore the reality of dual court systems with 
different legislative bodies exercising control over their procedures. And 
Congress has exercised its control over federal court procedures by 
                                                                                                                                                   
been explicitly reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, and is probably limited to Byrd itself. See 
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad for Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think the 
Supreme Court is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence? 73 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 963, 998-99 (1998).The status of the balancing test, however, is entirely 
distinct from the two goals identified in text, which are uncontroversial. 
9
 380 U.S. 460 (1965).  
10
 Id. at 467. The Court also focused on the need to prevent forum-shopping, but for 
purposes of identifying the goals underlying Erie, there is little or no difference between 
unfairness and forum-shopping. The Hanna Court did not mention the policy of protecting 
state authority, perhaps because by 1965 the constitutional basis for Erie had been 
discredited. There is nothing in Hanna to indicate abandonment of the basic concept of 
keeping state and federal authority within proper bounds.  
11
 Id. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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adopting the Rules Enabling Act.
12
 The REA authorized the creation of 
uniform rules of procedure for federal courts, which, in a well-recognized 
irony, took effect the same year as Erie. 
 
The Rules Enabling Act thus requires courts to adapt the Erie 
doctrine by taking into account the existence of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. And I contend that this accommodation, whatever form it takes, 
is a part of the Erie doctrine – pace John Ely13 – because it stems from the 
same sources and serves the same goals as Erie itself. In determining 
whether a state rule (of any kind) or a Federal Rule (of Civil Procedure) 
governs, we are necessarily specifying exactly how far the Erie doctrine 
extends. At its broadest, the Erie doctrine might command that a Federal 
Rule give way any time its application would result in a different outcome 
than the one that a state court, applying state rules of procedure, would 
reach. At its narrowest, Erie’s command to use state law might be fully 
trumped by any applicable Federal Rule, despite its effect on state policies 
or litigation outcomes. But in either case – and all the cases in between – it 
is the Erie doctrine that we are delineating. As Richard Freer noted more 
than two decades ago, the Erie doctrine “is actually comprised of two 
separate principles of vertical choice of law,” one embodied in the Rules 
Enabling Act and the other in the Rules of Decision Act.
14
 
 
Navigating the boundaries of Erie has not proven easy. Over the 
years, the Court has suggested several different approaches to 
accommodating the commands of Erie in the context of the Federal Rules. 
In a spate of cases in the 1940s, the Court appeared to adopt an extremely 
broad reading of Erie, refusing to apply the Rules in diversity cases if they 
                                                          
12
 28 U.S.C. § 2072. 
13
 See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693, 697-98 (1974) 
(suggesting that the validity and applicability of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure does not 
implicate either Erie or the Rules of Decision Act). But see Abram Chayes, The Bead 
Game, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 741, 752 (1974) (“not even the most luminous analytic framework 
relieves us of the necessity of discerning the state and federal policies at stake in cases 
involving a choice between state and federal law, whether the case arises under the Rules 
of Decision Act or the Enabling Act”) 
14
 Richard D. Freer, Erie’s Mid-Life Crisis, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 1087, 1089 (1989). He adds: 
“Together, these principles are intended to protect state sovereignty by ensuring that a 
federal court enforcing state claims acts substantively as a court of the state would act. At 
the same time, these principles also recognize the legitimate need of the federal courts, as a 
separate judicial system, to dictate their own procedures.” Id. at 1090. 
6 
 
produced a litigation outcome different from the outcome a state court 
would have reached.
15
 Almost simultaneously, however, the Court in 
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.
16
 upheld a district court order under Rule 35 – 
requiring a plaintiff to undergo a physical examination – in a diversity case 
in which it was quite likely that a state court would have lacked authority to 
issue such an order. Without even mentioning Erie (then only three years 
old), the Court found that Rule 35 “really regulates procedure” and thus had 
to be applied.
17
 Sibbach might be viewed as representing a very narrow 
reading of Erie, the polar opposite of the 1940s cases. 
 
These early cases reflect significant confusion about the breadth of 
Erie and its relationship to the Federal Rules. The Court tried to sort out the 
confusion in Hanna v. Plumer.
18
 Hanna reconciled the conflicting lines of 
precedent by arranging them along a new axis. The Court distinguished 
situations “covered by one of the Federal Rules”19 (like Sibbach) from those 
in which there is no governing Federal Rule (like the 1940s cases). In the 
former, the Sibbach test applies, and a federal court should follow the 
Federal Rule unless it does not really regulate procedure. To do otherwise, 
the Court suggested, would “disembowel either the Constitution’s grant of 
power over federal procedure or Congress’ attempt to exercise that power in 
the Enabling Act.”20 In other words, Erie’s contours and scope are limited 
by the existence of the federal power to adopt rules of procedure for federal 
courts. But in the absence of a Federal Rule – which the Court called “the 
typical, relatively unguided Erie choice”21 – the Hanna Court adopted a 
modified “outcome-determinative” test: A federal court should follow the 
state rule if applying federal law would run afoul of the “twin aims” of Erie: 
“discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable 
administration of the laws.”22 As Ely pointed out, the Hanna Court thus 
                                                          
15
 Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 236 U.S. 99 (1945); Ragan v. Merchants 
Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan 
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949). 
16
 312 U.S. 1 (1941) 
17
 Id. at 14. 
18
 380 U.S. 460 (1965) 
19
 Id. at 471. 
20
 Id. at 473-74. 
21
 Id. at 471. 
22
 Id. at 468. 
7 
 
protected state prerogatives more vigorously in the absence of a Federal 
Rule than in the presence of one.
23
  
 
This solution may reconcile the precedents, but it does not solve the 
underlying problem. The Erie doctrine tells us that federal courts sitting in 
diversity must respect state policy choices on matters of substance, to avoid 
both unfairness and the aggrandizement of federal court authority. But the 
doctrine also tells us – in Sibbach and reaffirmed in Hanna – that federal 
courts sitting in diversity must apply all valid Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. What should we do when the application of an otherwise valid 
Federal Rule runs afoul of a state policy choice on a matter of substance? 
 
Commentators have recognized a form of this dilemma, but have 
wrongly attributed it to the Court’s failure to give any meaning to the 
second section of the Rules Enabling Act, which prohibits federal 
rulemakers from adopting procedural rules that “abridge, enlarge or modify 
any substantive right.”24 According to many scholars, the problem is that 
the Court has wrongly ignored the possibility that a “procedural” Federal 
Rule might nevertheless impair substantive rights and therefore be invalid 
as beyond the rulemakers’ authority.25  
 
But framing the question as one of the validity of the Federal Rule 
under the REA (as Sibbach did) hides the real Erie issue: Application of a 
Federal Rule might impair substantive rights in one state but not in another 
or in one type of case but not another. And it is the Erie doctrine, not the 
REA, that controls the decision whether a particular state rule prevails over 
a conflicting federal one. The REA is all or nothing; if a Federal Rule is 
invalid, it is invalid in all cases – including not only in diversity cases in 
which there is no conflicting state law but also in federal question cases. Or, 
as Kevin Clermont puts it so nicely, a rule that is valid under the REA is 
                                                          
23
 Ely, supra note ___, at 720-22.  
24
 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). 
25
 Ely, supra note ___, at 718-20. See also Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 
1934, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1015 (1982); Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive Rights” (In 
the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 47 (1998); Martin Redish 
& Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and the Procedural-Substantive Tension: A 
Lesson in Statutory Interpretation, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 26 (2008). 
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“immune to any ‘as-applied’ challenge.”26 Erie, however, is quite explicitly 
tailored to protecting the substantive law and policies of individual states, 
and thus allows federal law to operate in some states but not others.  
 
As an example, consider a situation that has been before the 
Supreme Court twice. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 states that “[a] civil 
action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” State law in 
Kansas and Oklahoma (and some but not all other states) provides that the 
statute of limitations is tolled only when the defendant is served, not when 
the complaint is filed. If we conclude – as the Court did in two cases 30 
years apart
27
 – that the service requirement is bound up with, or an integral 
part of, state substantive law, then Erie seems to prohibit a federal court 
from concluding that the statute of limitations is tolled by filing, regardless 
of what Rule 3 says. But that does not mean that Rule 3 is invalid under the 
REA or that it cannot be applied to toll the statute of limitations in federal-
question cases or in diversity cases applying the law of states that do not 
have a law like the ones in Kansas and Oklahoma. (I will return later to how 
the Court managed to avoid confronting that issue in these cases.) The 
applicability of Rule 3 in any particular diversity case is an Erie question, 
not an REA question. 
 
Thus we must face the question of what to do when the application 
of a truly procedural Federal Rule, valid under the REA, nevertheless 
impairs substantive state rights.
28
 The two halves of the Erie doctrine – 
protecting state substantive policies and accommodating dual court systems 
– collide in such a case. And there is precedential support on both sides:  
Sibbach suggests that the Federal Rule should prevail, and Byrd suggests 
                                                          
26
 Kevin Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 987, 
1017 (2011); see also Catherine T. Struve, Institutional Practice, Procedural Uniformity, 
and As-Applied Challenges Under the Rules Enabling Act, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1181 
(2011). 
27
 Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Walker v. Armco 
Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980). 
28
 Commentary prior to Shady Grove addressed this question from a different angle, 
missing the problem that I seek to identify. In defining what counts as affecting substantive 
rights, one might take any of three approaches: nothing procedural counts, anything that 
has any effect on a substantive right counts, or anything that has more than an incidental 
effect on a substantive right counts. See Redish & Murashko, supra note ___. My concern 
is not about the scope of the effect, but rather about what should happen if the requisite 
effect is found. 
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that state law should prevail. This tension within the Erie doctrine is 
exacerbated when we try to harmonize Erie with the goals underlying the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. One primary guiding principle of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is transsubstantivity: The Rules should 
apply uniformly in all cases in federal court. This principle is in obvious 
tension with the half of Erie that prohibits applying a Federal Rule if, and 
only if, it impairs state rights and obligations. 
 
Shady Grove squarely raised the question whether to apply a Federal 
Rule that impairs state substantive rights in some states but not others. As 
the next section elaborates, four Justices explicitly followed Sibbach and 
five implicitly followed Byrd – although one of the Byrd Justices concluded 
that there was no impairment of state substantive rights and thus joined the 
four Sibbach Justices to direct application of the Federal Rule. 
Unfortunately, none of the Justices confronted the incompatibility between 
the two parts of the Erie doctrine. 
  
II.  TWO PATHS THROUGH SHADY GROVE 
 
 The facts of Shady Grove are mundane, although the implications 
are anything but. Shady Grove tendered a claim for insurance benefits to 
Allstate, which eventually paid the claim but not within the 30 days 
required by a New York state statute. Allstate also refused to pay the 
statutorily required interest of 2% per month on the late payment. Alleging 
that Allstate routinely paid claims late without paying the statutory interest, 
Shady Grove filed a class action in federal court under diversity 
jurisdiction. The minimum jurisdictional amount was satisfied only if the 
suit could be maintained as a class action, because the actual interest due to 
Shady Grove alone was less than $500.
29
 
 
 Although the suit apparently met all the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23 for a class action, the district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction 
because it found that under New York law the suit could not be maintained 
                                                          
29
 The total amount in controversy for the whole class, however, was more than $5 million, 
and thus there was federal jurisdiction over the class action (but not the individual actions) 
under the Class Action Fairness Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). 
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as a class action.
30
 New York Civil Practice Law § 901(b) prohibits class 
actions “to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery, created or 
imposed by statute,”31 which, the district court found, included the statutory 
interest provision at issue. The court of appeals affirmed,
32
 and the Supreme 
Court had to decide whether Rule 23 or § 901(b) governed. 
 
Eight of the Justices approached the issue as a technical question of 
interpretation of the Federal Rules. The case lent itself to that approach 
because of the way the Court had avoided the internal Erie tensions in prior 
precedent. In Walker v. Armco Steel Co.,
33
 one of the Rule 3 cases described 
earlier, the Court had sidestepped the question of what to do when a Federal 
Rule impairs state substantive rights. It did so by interpreting Rule 3 as not 
intended to toll a statute of limitations but rather to set the date from which 
timing requirements within the Federal Rules run. The Federal Rule was 
therefore irrelevant to the tolling question, and did not apply. Walker 
directed that the Rules should be interpreted according to their “plain 
meaning”34 and should apply only if they are “sufficiently broad to control 
the issue”35 – that is, if there is a “direct collision” between the Federal Rule 
and a state rule.
36
 
 
 Under Walker, then, the fate of Shady Grove’s class action hung on 
whether there was a direct collision between Rule 23 and § 901(b). If so, 
then under Sibbach and Hanna Rule 23 governed unless it was itself invalid 
as beyond Congress’s power to regulate. If not, then § 901(b) governed 
under Hanna’s modified “outcome-determinative” test, for surely a case 
that could be brought as a class action in federal court but not in state court 
would create inequities and induce forum-shopping.
37
  
                                                          
30
 466 F. Supp. 2d 467 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
31
 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law Ann. § 901(b) (2006). 
32
 549 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2008). 
33
 446 U.S. 740 (1980). The earlier of the two cases, Ragan, was one of those decided in 
the 1940s when the Court seemed unsure of how to accommodate the Federal Rules; it 
simply held that because the suit would have been barred in a Kansas court, it could not be 
brought in a federal court. 
34
 446 U.S. at 750 n.9 (1980). 
35
 Id. at 749. 
36
 Id.  
37
 It seems problematic to have to resort to Hanna’s outcome-determinative test once the 
Court has concluded that the Federal Rule does not apply: After all, if there is no applicable 
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 Four Justices took a mechanical and formalist approach to 
interpreting Rule 23. Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality that included 
Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and (for part of the opinion) Justice 
Sotomayor, placed the two rules side by side and concluded that there was a 
direct conflict between them. Rule 23 states that a class action “may be 
maintained” but § 901(b) says that a class action may not be maintained. 
Hence, under Hanna’s reading of Sibbach, Rule 23 trumps § 901(b) unless 
Rule 23 is itself invalid. And since (unsurprisingly) no Justice was willing 
to hold Rule 23 invalid, the plurality held that the suit could be maintained 
as a class action, New York state law notwithstanding. 
 
 Four Justices adopted a more functionalist approach to interpreting 
Rule 23. Justice Ginsburg, dissenting in an opinion joined by Justices 
Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito, argued that Rule 23’s potential to “transform a 
$500 case into a $5,000,000 award”38 required the Court to interpret Rule 
23 more narrowly to prevent “trench[ing] on state policy prerogatives.”39 
She – like the courts below – argued that while Rule 23 governs the 
considerations relevant to class certification, New York’s § 901(b) instead 
governs the availability of a particular remedy. As she pointed out, § 901(b) 
would not be an obstacle to a class action in a New York state court if the 
only remedy sought were actual damages or an injunction; New York law 
bars class actions only in suits to recover statutory penalties. Because there 
was no conflict between state and federal law, both could be given their 
intended scope. Hence, under Hanna’s reading of Erie, state law should 
govern because there was no conflicting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
and applying state law would prevent inequities and forum-shopping. 
 
 Is this just a simple difference of interpretive opinion? No, as Justice 
Stevens’ separate opinion (concurring in the judgment only) makes clear. 
Justice Stevens agreed with the plurality that Rule 23 conflicts with § 
901(b). And he ultimately agreed that Rule 23 should prevail. But he did so 
                                                                                                                                                   
Federal Rule, the only source of law is state. But the Court in Walker did invoke the “twin 
aims” of Erie to conclude that state law should apply, even though it had already concluded 
that the Federal Rule was not broad enough to reach the question. That, however, is the 
least of Walker’s problems. 
38
 130 S. Ct. at 1460 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.). 
39
 Id. at 1461. 
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only after concluding that the New York legislature did not intend § 901(b) 
as a substantive rule. In other words, he followed (without citing or 
quoting
40
) the Byrd suggestion that Erie commands the use of any state law, 
however procedural it may appear, if it is “bound up with [the] rights and 
obligations” of the parties. The dissent’s approach is just a version of this 
same Byrd analysis. While Justice Stevens (like Byrd itself) makes the 
character of the state law an independent inquiry, the dissenting Justices 
fold it into the interpretation of Rule 23. Either way, if the state legislature 
intended the state rule to operate substantively rather than procedurally, the 
Federal Rule must give way. 
 
 In the end, then, the opinions in Shady Grove break down into two 
opposite approaches to this basic Erie dilemma. One – that of the plurality – 
makes the character of the state law irrelevant; the only question is whether 
the federal Rule is procedural. As the plurality put it: “[I]t is not the 
substantive or procedural nature of the state law that matters, but the 
substantive or procedural nature of the Federal Rule.”41 The other – that of 
both the concurrence and the dissent – makes the character of the state law 
dispositive: Justice Stevens “agree[d] with Justice Ginsburg that there are 
some state procedural rules that federal courts must apply in diversity cases 
because they function as a part of the State’s definition of substantive rights 
and remedies.”42 
 
The varying approaches in Shady Grove thus expose the real 
problem with the Erie doctrine’s command, made most explicit in Hanna, 
to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but avoid impairing state 
substantive rights and obligations. Whenever a doctrine or statute has dual 
rationales, of course, the possibility exists that a case will arise pitting one 
rationale against the other. Shady Grove is that case, and the three opinions 
in the case perfectly illustrate the three responses to such a dilemma: 
Privilege one rationale, privilege the other rationale, or pretend that the 
rationales can be harmonized. Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion, by applying 
                                                          
40
 He did quote Byrd once, for the platitude that federal courts sitting in diversity operate as 
“an independent system for administering justice to litigants who properly invoke its 
jurisdiction.” 130 S. Ct. at 1448 (opinion of Stevens, J.). 
41
 Id. at 1444  (opinion of Scalia, J.) 
42
 Id. at 1448 (opinion of Stevens, J.) 
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Sibbach despite acknowledging its imperfections in cases that implicate 
state policy choices, opts for the transsubstantivity of the Federal Rules. 
Justice Stevens favors state policy choices, even though doing so might 
mean that Rule 23 applies differently in different states or different causes 
of action.
43
 And the dissenters try to have it both ways, by interpreting Rule 
23 in light of state policy choices – but that is a false alternative, because it 
means that Rule 23 would be interpreted differently in a diversity case 
applying New York law than in a diversity case applying the law of a state 
that had not adopted the policies underlying § 901(b). Academic 
commentators on Shady Grove can likewise be divided into those who think 
Justice Scalia got it right, those who think Justice Stevens got it right, and 
those who try to make the problem go away.
44
 
 
The underlying issue, therefore, is not merely a question of 
interpreting Federal Rules or separating substance from procedure. The real 
question is what should be done when a federal procedural rule conflicts 
with a state substantive rule (however we ultimately define “procedural” 
and “substantive”). Unfortunately, the Erie doctrine itself provides 
conflicting answers. Both of the approaches in Shady Grove are fully 
supported by Erie and its progeny. And the tension between them is 
inherent in the Erie doctrine; it cannot be resolved as long as that doctrine 
                                                          
43
 Because he ultimately concluded that New York’s § 901(b) does not represent a 
substantive policy choice, he did not have to live with the uniformity-undermining 
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remains established law. The next section shows that while Shady Grove 
may be the most recent – and perhaps the clearest – example of this 
unresolvable tension, it has manifested itself in many of the Court’s recent 
Erie cases.
45
 And, as in Shady Grove, different Justices have had different 
responses to the conflict, and, moreover, some Justices have used different 
and inconsistent approaches in different cases. 
 
III. A RECURRENT PROBLEM 
 
As several commentators have noted, Shady Grove was in many 
ways a replay of Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.
46
 but with the 
opposite side prevailing. In Gasperini, the Court was faced with a conflict 
between state and federal standards for review of an allegedly excessive 
jury verdict. A New York statute instructed courts of appeals to overturn an 
award if it “deviate[d] materially” from reasonable compensation.47 Federal 
courts, by contrast, adhered to the common-law rule that a jury’s verdict 
should stand unless it was so unreasonable that it “shock[ed] the 
conscience.”48 Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion, taking the same 
“split the baby” approach as in her Shady Grove dissent. After concluding 
that Federal Rule 59 – governing the grant of a new trial – did not mandate 
the adoption of a “shocks the conscience” test, and that the New York 
statute represented a substantive policy choice, she held that both the state 
and federal interests could be accommodated by having federal trial courts 
(rather than appellate courts, as the New York statute dictated) apply the 
                                                          
45
 The same issue also arises frequently in lower courts. For example, one current dispute is 
how to apply the relatively relaxed pleading standards of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and the minimal 
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 to cases in which the applicable state law requires that 
malpractice complaints be accompanied by an affidavit or certificate attesting that the 
claim has merit. Compare, e.g., Liggon-Redding v. Estate of Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258 (3d 
Cir. 2011) with, e.g., Braddock v. Orlando Reg’l Health Care Sys., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 580 
(M.D. Fla. 1995). One scholar has also suggested that “procedure is embedded in 
substantive law” insofar as the drafters of the law assumed particular procedures when 
calibrating the law to the desired level of deterrence. Thomas O. Main, The Procedural 
Foundations of Substantive Law, 87 Wash. U. L. Rev. 801, 802 (2010). If he is correct, 
then virtually every diversity case raises the Shady Grove issue. 
46
 518 U.S. 415 (1996). See, e.g., Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie 
and the Rules Enabling Act After Shady Grove, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1131, 1146-47 
(2011). 
47
 N.Y. CPLR 5501(c). 
48
 See 518 U.S. at 422 (describing the federal standard). 
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“deviates materially standard.”  Justice Scalia’s vehement dissent instead 
interpreted Rule 59 as incorporating the “shocks the conscience” standard 
and insisted that under Hanna Rule 59 must prevail even over a contrary 
state policy decision on substantive rights.
49
 As in Shady Grove, then, 
Justice Scalia chose federal-court uniformity over the state’s substantive 
policy choice, and Justice Ginsburg preferred to pretend that 
accommodating state choices was not in conflict with the Federal Rules or 
with transsubstantivity.
50
 
 
Gasperini thus provides an example of the Justices disagreeing 
about how to resolve the Erie dilemma. But in Walker v. Armco Steel 
Corp,
51
 the Rule 3 case already discussed, a unanimous Court was 
seemingly unaware of the problem. Recall that under Rule 3 “[a] civil 
action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”52 In Walker, the 
plaintiff had filed but not served the complaint in a diversity suit before the 
statute of limitations expired; state law required service of the complaint in 
order to toll the statute. The Court, purportedly interpreting Rule 3 
according to its “plain meaning,” held that Rule 3 had nothing to say about 
tolling the statute of limitations and thus that it was not in conflict with the 
state law: “Rule 3 governs the date from which various timing requirements 
                                                          
49
 He also argued that the Seventh Amendment precluded the use of the “deviates 
materially” standard and that the Court misapplied even the “unguided” Erie prong in 
finding the difference between the two standards to be substantive. 
50
 The different results in the two cases were not due to any Justice changing his or her 
mind, but rather to a change in personnel. Justice Stevens dissented in Gasperini on 
technical grounds, but noted that he “agree[d] with most of the reasoning in the Court's 
opinion.” 518 U.S. at 439.  As noted earlier, he similarly agreed with the reasoning, but not 
the result, of the dissenters in Shady Grove. His vote made no difference in Gasperini 
because there were five votes without him, but in Shady Grove his vote was the deciding 
one because Justice Ginsburg had lost an ally. Justices Kennedy and Breyer voted 
consistently with Justice Ginsburg for state policy choices, Justice Thomas voted 
consistently with Justice Scalia for the Federal Rules, and Chief Justice Roberts replaced 
Chief Justice Rehnquist as an additional vote for the Federal Rules. But although Justices 
O’Connor and Souter both voted with Justice Ginsburg in Gasperini, their successors split, 
with Justice Alito joining Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Shady Grove and Justice Sotomayor 
joining most of the majority opinion (although not the portion directly taking issue with 
Justice Stevens’s concurrence). Because Justice Sotomayor appears not to have taken a 
strong position, and Justice Kagan has replaced Justice Stevens, it is impossible to predict 
where the Court will go in the future. The only certainty is that the Court will face this 
question again, and it will implicate the same conflicting rationales.  
51
 446 U.S. 740 (1980). 
52
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 3. 
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of the Federal Rules begin to run, but does not affect state statutes of 
limitations.”53 A few years later, however, in West v. Conrail,54 the Court 
interpreted Rule 3 in a federal-question case and held that filing does toll 
the statute of limitations. Ironically, Justice Stevens’ unanimous opinion in 
West distinguished Walker in a footnote:  “Respect for the State's 
substantive decision that actual service is a component of the policies 
underlying the statute of limitations requires that the service rule in a 
diversity suit ‘be considered part and parcel of the statute of limitations.’ . . 
. This requirement, naturally, does not apply to federal-question cases.”55 
Having first interpreted Rule 3 in Walker supposedly without regard to state 
policies (ignoring the problem), the Court then offhandedly and unself-
consciously adopted what has now become the hotly-contested position that 
Rules should apply differently – or at least be interpreted differently – 
depending on whether state substantive policies are at stake. 
 
In Burlington Northern RR v. Woods,
56
 by contrast – decided 
between Walker and West – a unanimous Court took exactly the opposite 
approach. It ignored the problem by applying Hanna without any discussion 
of the possible substantive nature of the state law. Burlington Northern 
presented a conflict between Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, which 
makes the award of costs and damages for a frivolous appeal discretionary, 
and an Alabama statute that made such an award mandatory for 
unsuccessful appeals in particular circumstances. The Court concluded that 
the Federal Rule could “reasonably be classified as procedural,” and thus 
that under Hanna it displaced the Alabama statute.
57
 There was no 
discussion of the purposes behind the state statute or whether it might be a 
“component” of, for example, substantive state tort-reform policies.58 
 
Although Walker, West, and Burlington Northern were all 
unanimous – but not consistent with one another – dissension arose a year 
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 446 U.S. at 751. 
54
 481 U.S. 35 (1987). 
55
 Id. at 39 n.4. 
56
 480 U.S. 1 (1987). 
57
 Id. at 8. 
58
 Contrast this absence of discussion to the majority opinion in Gasperini, which carefully 
noted that the New York statute “invit[ing] more careful appellate scrutiny” of damage 
awards was “part of a series of tort reform measures.” 518 U.S. at 423. 
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after Burlington Northern, as the Court began to fracture along the line 
between federal uniformity and state substantive policy. Surprisingly, 
however, it was Justice Scalia who urged attention to state policies. Stewart 
Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.
59
 involved a clash between a federal 
court’s discretionary power to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and 
an Alabama statute that prohibited the enforcement of contractual forum-
selection clauses. The majority viewed the case as a straightforward Hanna 
issue, concluding that because the two laws directly conflicted and § 
1404(a) was within Congress’s power to enact, federal law governed. 
Justice Scalia dissented, arguing (in language later quoted by the dissent in 
Shady Grove) that “in deciding whether a federal procedural statute or Rule 
of Procedure encompasses a particular issue, a broad reading that would 
create significant disuniformity between state and federal courts should be 
avoided if the text permits.”60 The majority responded to this argument 
much as Justice Scalia himself eventually did in Shady Grove: “Not the 
least of the problems with the dissent's analysis is that it makes the 
applicability of a federal statute depend on the content of state law.”61 
 
In another recent situation, the Court avoided the problem by 
recharacterizing the issue as not about the Erie doctrine at all. At the same 
time, its reasoning highlighted and further confused the core problems of 
Erie. In Semktek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,
62
 a California 
federal court sitting in diversity dismissed Semtek’s California state-law 
claims with prejudice on statute-of-limitations grounds. Semtek refiled the 
claims in a Maryland state court under Maryland law; Maryland had a 
longer statute of limitations. The question before the Supreme Court was 
whether the federal-court dismissal was claim-preclusive, barring the 
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 487 U.S. 22 (1988) 
60
 Id. at 37-38 (citing Walker but not Burlington Northern) (Scalia, J., dissenting); quoted 
in Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1461 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
61
 Id. at 31 n.10 (majority opinion). Compare Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1441 (opinion of 
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(“nothing in our decision [in Walker] suggested that a federal court may resolve an obvious 
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 531 U.S. 497 (2001). 
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Maryland suit. After concluding that neither precedent nor Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 41(b) answered the question, the Court held that the 
preclusive effect of a federal-court judgment is governed by federal 
common law but that in diversity cases the content of federal preclusion law 
is the law that would be applied in state court.  
 
Semtek is a minefield under Erie, and Justice Scalia’s unanimous 
opinion tiptoed across it bobbing and weaving to avoid disaster. Erie itself 
made several cameo appearances, each one creating more questions than 
answers. 
 
To begin with, the Semtek Court suggested that to interpret Rule 
41(b)
63
 as directing that all dismissals “on the merits” be accorded claim-
preclusive effect – regardless of whether state law would give such 
dismissals preclusive effect – would “arguably” violate both the Rules 
Enabling Act and Erie by modifying substantive rights and encouraging 
forum-shopping.
64
 This is exactly the kind of state-sensitive interpretation 
of the Federal Rules that the Court adopted in Walker and that the dissent 
urged in Shady Grove. The citation to the REA in Semtek might distinguish 
Walker and Shady Grove and resolve the tension between following state 
substantive policies and applying the Federal Rules transsubstantively; the 
Court seems to be suggesting that Rule 41(b) can never be interpreted to 
equate “on the merits” with claim-preclusion. But in an odd footnote, 
Justice Scalia acknowledged the possibility that Rule 41(b) might be 
interpreted differently in different situations: 
 
Rule 41(b), interpreted as a preclusion-establishing rule, would not 
have the two effects described in the preceding paragraphs – 
arguable violation of the Rules Enabling Act and incompatibility 
with Erie – if the court’s failure to specify an other-than-on-the-
merits dismissal were subject to reversal on appeal whenever it 
would alter the rule of claim preclusion applied in the State in which 
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 Rule 41(b), governing involuntary dismissals, provides in relevant part that any non-
voluntary dismissal (with three exceptions not relevant to the case) “operates as an 
adjudication on the merits” “[u]nless the dismissal order states otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
41(b). 
64
 531 U.S. at 503-04. 
19 
 
the federal court sits. No one suggests that this is the rule, and we 
are aware of no case that applies it.
65
 
 
In other words, although one might interpret Rule 41(b) as preclusion-
determinative only when doing so did not impair state rights, that 
interpretation is not plausible under the caselaw. But both the plurality in 
Shady Grove and the majority in Stewart rejected the possibility of 
differential application of the Federal Rules as a matter of principle, not 
precedent.
66
 That is a far cry from the unadorned suggestion, in the Semtek 
footnote just quoted, that differential application is not supported by 
precedent. So Semtek ultimately leaves the dilemma unresolved: Maybe 
Erie and the Rules Enabling Act work together to invalidate any 
interpretation of any Federal Rule that might possibly impair substantive 
rights in any state, or maybe they are still at cross-purposes insofar as Erie 
commands interpreting or applying the Rules in light of particular state law. 
 
 Even more peculiar is the Court’s treatment of the ultimate question 
in Semtek: the source of law governing the preclusive effect of a federal-
court diversity judgment. At first glance, this seems like a straightforward 
Erie question. Because there is no federal Rule or statute on point, the Court 
should apply Erie (as articulated in the portion of Hanna dealing with the 
“unguided” Erie choice) and ask whether applying federal common-law 
preclusion doctrines, rather than state law, would create inequities or 
encourage forum-shopping.  
 
But the Court did not take that route. It instead held that federal 
common law always governs the preclusive effect of a federal court 
judgment, but that in diversity cases the content of federal common law 
should ordinarily mirror that of the state in which the diversity court sits: 
“This is, it seems to us, a classic case for adopting, as the federally 
prescribed rule of decision, the law that would be applied by state courts in 
the State in which the federal diversity court sits.”67 At the same time, 
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 Id. at 504 n.1 (citation omitted and emphasis added). 
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 See TAN at ___. 
67
 531 U.S. at 508. Not the least of the peculiarities of this holding is that it seems to ignore 
the teaching of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manuf. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) by applying 
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20 
 
however, the Court supported this conclusion by citing Gasperini, Walker, 
and other Erie cases. It also went on to suggest that “any other rule would 
produce the sort of ‘forum-shopping . . . and . . . inequitable administration 
of the laws’ that Erie seeks to avoid . . . .”68 
 
In Semtek, then, the Court used the principles underlying the Erie 
doctrine to require application of state preclusion law, but explicitly denied 
that Erie and its progeny were dispositive. One benefit of this approach 
becomes apparent when the reader gets to the next paragraph of the opinion. 
The Court noted there that “[t]his federal reference to state law will not 
obtain, of course, in situations in which the state law is incompatible with 
federal interests.”69 Absent resurrection of the Byrd balancing test – which 
no Justice seems to favor – this preference for federal interests could not be 
accomplished under the Erie doctrine.
70
 Holding Erie obliquely rather than 
directly relevant allows the Court an escape from state substantive policies 
of which it does not approve.
71
  
 
The Court thus avoided the central dilemma of Erie – what to do 
when a state’s substantive policy decisions clash with application of an 
arguably procedural federal rule
72
 – by not applying Erie at all. There is no 
need for the interpretive contortions of a case like Walker: In federal-
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question cases, the courts are free to fashion any federal common-law 
preclusion doctrines they like, while in diversity cases they avoid any clash 
between federal preclusion law and state substantive policies by 
“borrowing” state preclusion law. And if a case arises in which the Court 
thinks that some federal interest – akin to the interest in the transsubstantive 
application of the Federal Rules – should trump state preclusion law, the 
Court will say so directly rather than insisting that it is the procedural nature 
of the federal interest that requires application of federal law.
73
 
 
Notice, however, that this result is accomplished only by pretending 
that the Erie doctrine does not exist. Perhaps we should take that as a hint 
that the Erie doctrine should not exist. In other words, while most of the 
recent Erie cases illustrate the unavoidable internal conflict within the Erie 
doctrine, Semtek instead shows us an alternative to Erie that provides a way 
out of the dilemma. It is to that alternative that I now turn. 
 
IV. THE ONLY VIABLE SOLUTION 
 
 The inescapable internal tension between the two rationales of the 
Erie doctrine has produced an unpredictable and inconsistent set of 
precedents as the Court (and sometimes an individual Justice) vacillates 
between one rationale and the other without recognizing the underlying 
dilemma. We could solve the problem by getting rid of diversity 
jurisdiction, which would eliminate the need for any kind of Erie doctrine.
74
 
We could also solve it by repealing the Rules Enabling Act and resurrecting 
the Conformity Act, which directed federal courts to apply state procedural 
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 That Semtek in fact allows the Court to sidestep Erie is illustrated by a comparison 
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22 
 
rules in diversity cases. Neither of those options seems realistic.
75
 The 
remaining solution is to eliminate the source of the problem by eliminating 
the Erie doctrine and substituting a different and more coherent way to 
accommodate state substantive policies with the demands of a separate and 
independent federal judicial system. 
 
 What would the world look like without Erie? In 1938, perhaps, it 
had to look like Swift. But seventy-five years later, there is no particular 
reason to return to Swift’s illusory distinction between local and general law 
or its invocation of a naturalist and anti-positivist jurisprudence.
76
 Instead, 
we can take a cue from Semtek and look at whether federal interests trump 
state policy choices in the particular circumstances. If federal interests 
should prevail, federal law applies; if there is no pressing federal interest, 
the default option is to apply state law – not as a matter of constitutional 
command, but for the practical reasons recognized by the Court in both Erie 
and Semtek.
77
 
 
 In short, perhaps a Semtek-inspired “new Erie” doctrine should look 
like implied preemption of the “purposes-and-objectives” type:78 A 
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presumption that state-law policy choices govern in diversity cases unless 
there is reason to believe that applying state law would interfere with some 
important federal interest or objective. Similarly, a focus on the state law’s 
effect on federal interests would mirror current doctrine under the dormant 
Commerce Clause, which also allows uncodified federal interests to 
overcome state regulation.
79
 Ironically, patterning the new Erie doctrine 
after implied preemption should be less controversial than the implied 
preemption doctrine itself.
80
 Under implied preemption, the Court relies on 
federal interests to determine what happens in state court: a state-law claim 
that is preempted cannot be brought in either state or federal court. Under 
my proposal, the Court uses federal interests to determine only what 
happens in federal court, a much more justifiable result.
81
   
 
And despite its novelty, my proposal draws on existing doctrine. 
Semtek is not alone in its insistence that sometimes federal common law 
displaces state law notwithstanding Erie. First, the Court has applied federal 
common law that is inconsistent with state law when it finds that the 
differences between the two are not likely to produce forum-shopping or 
inequities.
82
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More broadly, the Court has consistently held – beginning with a 
case decided on the same day as Erie
83
 – that federal common law governs, 
even in diversity cases, if the suit implicates “uniquely federal interests.”84 
State law is displaced whenever there exists “a significant conflict between 
some federal policy or interest and the use of state law.”85 To date, the 
Court has endorsed this use of federal common law in only six limited 
“enclaves,”86 and scholars have defended these enclaves largely on 
historical or structural grounds.
87
 My proposal generalizes from these 
limited enclaves to create a broader concept of conflict preemption: Courts 
may create and apply federal common law whenever doing so is necessary 
to protect federal interests that would be frustrated by the application of 
state law. 
 
 The primary difference between my proposal and the existing 
doctrines authorizing the use of federal common law, then, lies in its level 
of generality. Rather than creating narrow categories of federal enclaves and 
adding categories piecemeal by analogy, I suggest a new overarching 
standard to govern the displacement of state law. Replacing the Court’s 
current categorical approach with a generalized standard has all the usual 
advantages of such a move, and is all the more beneficial in a jurisprudence 
as beset with problems and inconsistencies as the Erie doctrine is.
88
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 The final advantage of my proposal is that it eliminates the two 
unjustified dichotomies I mentioned earlier. It makes federal judicial power 
congruent with federal legislative power, and it treats all federal interests as 
potentially subject to judicial protection regardless of whether those 
interests fall into particular identifiable categories. Ironically, expanding 
federal judicial power in this way can itself be seen as mandated by one of 
Erie’s most basic moves. In overruling Swift, the Erie court dictated that 
state legislative and judicial lawmaking be treated identically. But current 
doctrine does not accord the same courtesy to federal judicial lawmaking; 
my proposal would align state and federal judicial (vis-a-vis legislative) 
power.
89
    
 
 
V. CONSEQUENCES 
 
I turn finally to the consequences of adopting my new proposal. In 
many run-of-the-mill Erie cases – such as an auto accident between citizens 
of different states – the new Erie doctrine probably would not differ much 
from the old one. As long as there is no federal interest in a uniform federal 
auto-accident tort law, state law will apply to those cases by default.
90
 
 
 But replacing the Erie doctrine with a preemption approach would 
produce very different results in two particular types of cases. First, there 
are the cases that form the heart of this essay, in which the old Erie doctrine 
issues conflicting commands. Under my proposal, the Court would instead 
have to decide explicitly whether the federal interest in uniform, 
transsubstantive procedural rules for federal courts is more important than 
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allowing states to make substantive policy choices. If it is, then the Federal 
Rules will always prevail, even over a state law intended to operate 
substantively. That answer supports the Shady Grove plurality, the 
Gasperini dissent, and the unanimous Stewart and Burlington Northern 
cases; it undermines the Shady Grove concurrence and dissent, the majority 
in Gasperini, and the Walker and West combination. (Determining that 
uniformity and transsubstantivity are not sufficiently important to trump 
state policy choices produces the opposite results.) Whether a federal 
interest in uniformity and transsubstantivity should be considered important 
enough to override state substantive law is a separate question, which I do 
not address here.
91
  
 
The key point is not how these cases should come out but rather that 
the Court would be deciding them transparently and in the name of an 
overriding federal interest, rather than denying the existence of a conflict or 
pretending that the result turned on an interpretation of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.
92
 In one sense, then, adopting a Semtek-like preemption 
approach in these cases takes a jurisprudential dispute that is currently being 
fought underground (or through proxies) and moves it into daylight where it 
can be addressed directly. The cases would also be more predictable: Either 
the interest in uniformity or transsubstantivity is sufficient to overcome any 
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state policy choice, or it is not. The case-by-case approach that has led to 
the confusing vacillation would disappear under my approach. The current 
doctrine is incoherent; my proposal at least yields coherence.
93
 It is difficult 
to see why anyone would oppose a change with such salutary effects, except 
perhaps out of nostalgia, a misplaced allegiance to the purported 
constitutional basis for Erie,
94
 or a visceral dislike of any doctrine that 
openly admits that judges actually exercise – and should exercise – 
discretion.  
 
 One further question about conflicts between state substantive law 
and Federal Rules remains to be discussed. Is the weighting of federal 
uniformity a one-time decision applicable across the board to all Federal 
Rules and all state laws, or does it depend on either the particular state 
interest or the particular Federal Rule?  
 
As to variations in state laws, anything short of an all-or-nothing 
decision is simply a return to the current regime, albeit on a more 
transparent basis. There is little predictability in a jurisprudence that lets 
judges weigh each individual state interest against a federal interest in 
uniformity, and allows different conclusions with regard to different state 
policies. In this, my proposal is unlike the analysis under preemption or 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrines, which depend on the actual threat that 
the particular state law poses to implementation of the federal interest. The 
reason for the difference lies in the different nature of the federal interest in 
the Erie procedural cases: Unlike an interest in particular federal policies 
(as in preemption) or free-flowing interstate commerce (as in the dormant 
Commerce Clause) an interest in uniformity is always necessarily 
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undermined by allowing it to vary depending on the interests arrayed 
against it.
95
 
 
I am more agnostic about whether the interest in uniformity and 
transsubstantivity might vary across different Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. It is certainly possible that uniformity might be more important 
for some Rules than for others, and thus the Court might conclude that some 
Rules apply regardless of their impact on state substantive choices and 
others do not. Such an approach sacrifices some predictability but still 
retains the core idea of transparently analyzing the conflict as one between 
enabling state policy decisions and fostering the underlying goals of the 
Federal Rules. 
 
 The second type of case affected by my suggestion is likely to 
generate considerably more controversy, both because it is of more practical 
consequence and because it is further afield from the core question (Erie in 
the procedural context) of this essay. For those reasons, I sketch my 
arguments only briefly; I hope to develop them further in a later article.  
 
In our national (or global) consumer economy, much corporate 
activity is what Sam Issacharoff has labeled national market activity: 
“conduct that arises from mass produced goods entering the stream of 
commerce with no preset purchaser or destination.”96 If the goods are 
defective or cause injury, the effect is felt nationwide but liability is 
imposed state by state under potentially different substantive laws and 
policies. Those laws and policies, in turn, offer different protections for 
consumers in different states and also necessarily affect the incentives of 
corporations in their design and manufacturing of products. One state’s law 
has the capacity to drive national standards; different state requirements 
might impose conflicting obligations on manufacturers; and consumers in 
some state may suffer uncompensated damage for which consumers in other 
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states are compensated.
97
 Particularly with regard to defendants, then, the 
substantive products-liability law of any given state has nationwide 
implications and effects. In short, substantive state policy judgments have 
the potential to wreak havoc on our national economy.
98
 Regardless of 
whether Congress chooses to federalize products-liability law,
99
 there is 
thus a strong federal interest in uniform liability rules for corporations 
whose products are distributed indiscriminately to consumers in every state. 
On my theory, that interest is enough to override individual state policy 
choices and require federal courts to develop and apply a federal common 
law of products liability in diversity cases. 
 
 Using federal law to protect a national economy has a historical 
pedigree that predates even Swift v. Tyson. In 1821, Chief Justice Marshall 
equated the federal interest in national commerce with the federal interest in 
foreign affairs: “That the United States form, for many, and for most 
important purposes, a single nation, has not yet been denied. In war, we are 
one people. In making peace, we are one people. In all commercial 
regulations, we are one and the same people.”100 This sentiment accords 
with the generally accepted basis of diversity jurisdiction as protecting 
national commercial interests from parochial state laws.
101
  
 
 The consequences of a replacing state substantive law with a federal 
common law of products liability are twofold. First, nationwide class 
actions under Rule 23, currently rarely certified, would become viable. As 
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Judge Richard Posner has pointed out in denying certification to a 
nationwide class, “[t]he voices of the quasi-sovereigns that are the states of 
the United States sing negligence with a different pitch.”102 Those different 
tunes mean that the same law will not apply to all members of a nationwide 
class of consumers, and thus certification is inappropriate for many – if not 
most – nationwide classes. My proposal, by requiring the application of 
federal common law to these national-market claims, makes the different 
tunes irrelevant and allows certification of a nationwide class. The flip side, 
however, is that once a nationwide class is certified in federal court (or even 
if individual suits are brought in federal court), federal, not state, law would 
determine liability. And because federal jurisdictional statutes require only 
minimal diversity in large class actions,
103
 plaintiffs who prefer to stay in 
state court to take advantage of state law would be able to do so only if they 
limited the class to consumers in one state. Both consumers and 
corporations would benefit: consumers would be able to consolidate their 
claims into a nationwide class action and would all receive the same levels 
of protection and compensation, and corporations would be protected from 
the idiosyncrasies of particular states and the potential for conflicting 
standards of liability. 
* * * 
 By citing (but not directly relying on) Erie and its progeny in 
Semtek, the Court showed us the way to bring back together two ideas that 
have been separated for 75 years. Federal court power to shape substantive 
law is intertwined with and depends on the existence of federal interests 
sufficient to overcome the limits on federal lawmaking and the premise of 
residual state power. Those federal interests exist regardless of whether they 
have been codified by Congress. But Erie sheared off some of those federal 
interests and insisted that they could not be protected in the absence of 
congressional codification. The Erie doctrine and the development of 
enclaves of federal common law are, at one level, a history of attempts to 
figure out which federal interests require codification as a prerequisite to 
judicial protection and which do not. My proposal, inspired by Semtek, is to 
unify the two inquiries with a transparent standard that asks directly 
whether there exists a sufficient federal interest to demand the application 
of federal rather than state law. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The Erie doctrine is a mess. Every time the Court wades into it, it 
gets worse. The Court’s failure to save Erie should not be surprising: The 
underlying problem is that the doctrine itself is internally incoherent. The 
only solution is to scrap Erie and replace it with a more coherent vision of 
the role of federal courts in a regime of dual sovereigns. And the role of 
federal courts should be the same as the role of the federal government in 
general: protecting national interests from individual state policy choices 
detrimental to the nation as a whole. Seventy-five years ago, when Erie 
limited the role of federal courts, the federal government was barely 
beginning to exercise its authority. Isn’t it time that the federal courts catch 
up with the massive expansion of the rest of federal power? 
